As we learn new information about the social and moral behaviors of other people, we form and update character judgments of them, and this can profoundly influence how we regard and act towards others. In the study reported here, we capitalized on two interesting neurological patient populations where this process of complex "moral updating" may go awry: patients with bilateral damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and patients with bilateral damage to hippocampus (HC). We predicted that vmPFC patients, who have impaired emotion processing, would exhibit reduced moral updating, and we also investigated how moral updating might be affected by severe declarative memory impairment in HC patients. The vmPFC, HC, and brain-damaged comparison (BDC) participants made moral judgments about unfamiliar persons before and after exposure to social scenarios depicting the persons engaged in morally good, bad, or neutral behaviors. In line with our prediction, the vmPFC group showed the least amount of change in moral judgments, and interestingly, the HC group showed the most amount of change. These results suggest that the vmPFC and hippocampus play critical but complementary roles in updating moral character judgments about others: the vmPFC may attribute emotional salience to moral information, whereas the hippocampus may provide necessary contextual information from which to make appropriate character judgments.
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Introduction
In a constantly changing environment, it is vital that people update their knowledge base as new information becomes available. For example, knowledge about the self, perceptions of others, and interpersonal motivations must continuously be updated in order to support advantageous social functioning (Lieberman, 2007) . In order to appropriately update one's social and moral knowledge base, both the emotional salience and the context of newly acquired social and moral information must be taken into account. For example, if you overhear your officemate lying to her husband, you may form a negative moral judgment of her. If you later discover that she lied to cover up a surprise birthday party for him, you may change your moral judgment, but this time in the positive direction. In this example, both the emotional salience and the context of the situation are factored into forming a moral judgment; and as a consequence, your regard for and behavior towards your officemate in the future may be very different, depending on whether or not you took all the relevant information, as well as your previous interactions with that person, into account.
When a person first meets another person, an immediate and spontaneous impression of that other person is formed based on information at hand such as verbal and nonverbal behavior and appearance. In the field of social psychology, it has been demonstrated that when people are simultaneously shown a person's face and a behavior associated with a particular trait (such as aggression or selfishness), people form spontaneous impressions of others that are bound to that trait, and these impressions are robust and maintained in memory (e.g., Todorov & Uleman, 2002 , 2004 . In addition, after learning a particular person-trait pairing, when that same person is perceived again, neural substrates known for their involvement in emotion processing and social cognition, such as anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus (STS), are recruited (Todorov, Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby, 2007) .
Not surprisingly, the same neural systems involved in impression formation, or forming a social judgment of a person based on limited behavioral information, seem to be involved in moral judgment (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004) . Borrowing a definition of morality from Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, and Grafman (2005) , moral judgment may be defined as judging the moral behavior of a person against a set of customs and values
